This analysis of outpatient medical expenditures for children identifies which children experience a relative decline in medical expenditures between 1977 and 1987. The paper also evaluates some standard methodologies used in medical demand estimation. Our semiparametic approach models expenditures simultaneously with the choice of insurance plan and the decision to incur any expenditures. Children in poor families and Hispanic children witness a decline in expenditures relative to other children. Children on Medicaid and black children experience stable expenditures over time. These results imply that the recent Medicaid expansions may not help all children attain good health. The results are sensitive to assumptions of insurance exogeneity, but are insensitive to the assumptions governing the decision to incur any expenditures. The general emphasis in the health economics literature on sample selection instead of insurance endogeneity therefore seems misguided.
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I. Introduction
This paper examines outpatient medical expenditures for children in 1977 and 1987. The analysis first identifies which socio-economic groups of children experience a relative decline in expenditures over the decade. It is these children who should be the focus of public policy. The analysis then evaluates some of the standard methodologies used to estimate the demand for medical services. Our econometric framework nests much of the medical care demand literature, and we evaluate the adequacy of conventional estimation schemes.
Improving the health status of children has become an increasingly important public policy goal. Legislation often focuses on Medicaid, the federal-state entitlement program that provides health insurance to needy children. For example, Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility to healthy children in 1986, 1987, and 1989 . These eligibility expansions are intended to reduce the disparities in medical services between low income and higher income children. This research examines pre-expansion data to determine the degree to which medical expenditures are indeed a function of Medicaid use, and to quantify the interrelationships between household demographics and health outcomes.
We analyze outpatient expenditures using an econometric model of discrete and continuous choice. The paper models the simultaneous selection between three discrete insurance states, the discrete decision of whether to have an initial contact with an outpatient provider (i.e.
to participate in the outpatient system), and the continuous level of outpatient medical expenditures for the participants. The choice of insurance is between private insurance, Medicaid, and no insurance. The analysis uses two single-year panel data sets, the 1977 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) and the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES).
We feel this simultaneous framework captures some of the best aspects of the existing literature while avoiding some of its shortcomings. Partial analyses of the relationships between medical utilization, insurance, and demographic characteristics include Cunningham and Monheit (1990) , Newacheck (1992) , and Spillman (1992) . These papers do provide information on the correlations across some variables. However, the absence of a behavioral model and the failure to account for unobservable factors common to the choice of insurance and expenditures make the results difficult to interpret. At the other extreme, Gilleskie (1995) and Schone, Selden and Zabinski (1995) estimate behavioral models of the demand for medical services. These fullystructural models incorporate the influence of unobservable variables and yield parameters with clear interpretations. Nevertheless, behavioral stochastic dynamic models cannot include more than a handful of observed variables and are heavily driven by distributional and functional form assumptions. Our work, like that of Currie and Thomas (1995) , Goldman (1995) , and Currie and Gruber (1996) , is intended to strike a balance between these two approaches, and provide structural estimates of expenditures that incorporate a large number of observed variables. In addition, we can evaluate the extent to which the estimation technique matters in a fullysimultaneous selection model with economically justified exclusion restrictions.
The methodological literature concerning self-selection into positive health expenditures is already quite large. The standard methodology is the "two-part" model popularized by the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE) and extensively discussed in Duan et. al. (1983) , Duan et. al (1984) , and Manning, Newhouse et. al. (1987) . On the other hand, Hay and Olsen (1984) and Maddala (1985) argue for a sample selection (Heckit) approach. Despite these theoretical disagreements, concludes through Monte Carlo simulations that the two-part and sample selection approaches yield very similar results.
The potential endogeneity of insurance has received less attention in the medical expenditure literature than has selection bias. Although Cameron, Trivedi, Milne, and Piggott (1988) estimate the joint choice of health care and health insurance in Australia, much research relies on the RHIE data, where insurance is exogenous by construction. Given that the RHIE data date from the mid 1970s, an investigation into the possible endogeneity of insurance in expenditure estimation seems especially timely.
In our model, the endogeneity of participation and insurance status comes about because common unobservable factors influence all choices. For example, parental attitudes toward physicians can influence the decision to purchase insurance, to use any outpatient medical services, and the observed expenditure level. Our semiparametric technique uses a discrete approximation to control for the common factor. The econometric model is in the spirit of Heckman and Singer (1984) , and is an application of the Mroz (1999) estimator to health economics.
The results indicate that both economic and demographic variables have grown in importance between 1977 and 1987. Children in poor families are increasingly likely to have lower medical expenditures than their wealthier peers. Hispanic children experience a decline in expenditures relative to white children. Black children have lower expenditures than white children, but the differential does not widen over time. The relationship between Medicaid and expenditures is also stable. Like Currie and Thomas (1995) , we conclude that public policies that equalize budget constraints will not equalize care across different groups of children.
Our methodological comparisons suggest that methodology matters, and that insurance is endogenous to expenditure estimation. The importance of common shocks to Medicaid enrollment and medical expenditures, such as would occur if a medical clinic enrolled an eligible child at the first visit, seems to have grown over time. Research that does not allow for the simultaneous determination of Medicaid and medical expenditures will produce inconsistent estimates of the key policy parameters. On the other hand, the paper confirms that selection into positive expenditures is empirically unimportant. This paper proceeds as follows. Section II first presents an econometric model of medical expenditures and insurance choice, and then describes the data. Section III presents estimation results, and Section IV concludes. Maddala (1985) characterizes the estimation of medical expenditures by writing "it is time that more thought be given to the exact sources of selectivity bias and a 'structural' formulation be attempted. Otherwise all we have is lip service to the basic problems. The health care area is one where policy questions are very important, and these can be analyzed only if a structural formulation is adopted. Otherwise, there is no need to depart from mother OLS." (p. 16).
II. An Econometric Model of Outpatient Medical Expenditures
Although over a decade old, we consider this point still valid, and our econometric model is in its spirit. We evaluate outpatient medical expenditures using an econometric model of the simultaneous choice of insurance status, participation into positive expenditures, and the level of This section first characterizes the underlying optimization problem, then presents the empirical model, and finally describes the data. Although our ultimate empirical work deals with household heads making choices on behalf of their children, we refer here to the utilitymaximizing individual for ease of exposition. In order to minimize notation, we do not use an individual-level subscript.
A. The Economic Model
This subsection outlines the simplest possible economic model needed to generate endogenous selection and insurance. The model is a two stage model under uncertainty. The consumer ex ante chooses the insurance plan, observes the health outcome, and ex post chooses health services and consumption. This model is a direct application of Cameron, Trivedi, Milne, and Piggott (1988) to a world with two types of individuals. Some individuals already have knowledge of the health care system (including how to acquire health care), and some do not.
Participating in the health care system requires a minimum threshold of knowledge, and uninformed individuals must acquire knowledge in order to participate. In short, an individual must know where the doctor is in order to see the doctor. The acquisition of this knowledge requires "work" and generates disutility.
In the first period, the individual maximizes expected utility by choosing among i=1 to I mutually exclusive and exhaustive insurance plans. The choice of insurance plan influences the subsequent price of medical services and income. In the second period, the individual maximizes 
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(1) utility given the budget constraint and the realization on health. As is usually the case with dynamic problems, the model is solved recursively.
In the second period, the individual picks consumption and health services to solve where C is consumption of a composite commodity; H is health services; d is a health quality i transformation factor; W is the additional knowledge required to participate in the health care system; s is the realized value from the distribution, F(S), of health outcomes; X and , are vectors i of characteristics of the child and household; P and P are the respective unit prices for the Informed individuals are not required to participate in the health care system. If an uninformed individual chooses to participate in the health care system, however, then that person must become informed. The "cost" of acquiring knowledge of the health care system is measured
in terms of the decrease in utility associated with moving from W=0 to W=W . The participation 1 rule for positive expenditures then becomes where H* and C* are the optimal demands for health services and consumption, respectively. H* does not depend on W because of the assumption of strong separability.
In the first period, the consumer makes the discrete choice of insurance policy knowing only the cumulative distribution of S, F(S). The consumer selects the policy i to solve
Given the precise form for U(), the solution to equation (1) yields the demand for health services.
Equation (2) yields a specification for the participation decision, and equation (3) Our model is also somewhat related to Kenkel's (1990) Medicaid.
Because government policy uses the federal poverty status as a benchmark, we replace income, Y, with X variables indicating that the child's household falls into one of five poverty Because Medicaid eligibility is not known with certainty, equation (4) cannot be 1 estimated on the full set of three choices for the Medicaid-eligible and on a restricted set of two choices for the Medicaid-ineligible. Equation (4) could, however, be specified such that eligibility is probabilistic. Under this estimation scheme, observations on Medicaid are by definition eligible. Observations in the other two insurance states are Medicaid-eligible with probability P, and Medicaid-ineligible with probability (1-P). We reject this scheme for two reasons. First, the absence of data on state of residence, assets, and other key variables implies that P is identified by functional form only. Results from this more-complicated estimation scheme therefore provide no real information beyond the current equation (4). Second, the focus of this paper is on trends in medical expenditures, and estimation involving probabilistic eligibility is not needed to control for the potential endogeneity of Medicaid in expenditure estimation. The individual also solves equation (1) and equation (2) and compares the utility associated with participating in the health care system with the utility associated with not
participating. The individual chooses whether to participate in the health care system and, for participants, the level of outpatient expenditures. Formally, where E is a latent variable that determines whether the discrete outcome EXP=1 occurs, W is a A fundamental feature of this model is that equations (4) through (6) Medicaid are therefore inconsistent because the insurance variables are endogenous in the log expenditure regression. In addition, failure to account for common unobservables will reduce the efficiency of all the estimates.
We use the "discrete factor approximation" estimator of Mroz (1999) to estimate equations (4) through (6) simultaneously. The unknown joint distribution of the unobserved variables is approximated using a random effects, components-of-variance structure. Each stochastic term includes a common factor, and this factor allows for nonzero covariances across the disturbances. The distribution of the factor is modeled as a discrete step function. This semiparametric specification of the error structure is an application of the Heckman and Singer (1984) control for unobservable heterogeneity in duration models. Mroz (1999) provides Monte
Carlo evidence that discrete factor estimators perform better than maximum likelihood estimators that assume joint normality when the true distribution of the disturbances is not normal. Their
Monte Carlo results also suggest that discrete factor estimators perform well when the true distribution is normal. Goldman (1995) uses this estimator to analyze utilization patterns within the military-health services system, and Card and Sullivan (1988) , Gritz (1993) , and others use the method to analyze labor market outcomes.
The stochastic structure of each of the five equations is the sum of an equation-specific error and a common error. In other words, a common linear factor captures the dependence of all health outcomes on the unobserved variables. We first derive the likelihood function for an individual's observed outcomes conditional upon the value of the unobserved factor, and then integrate out over the distribution of the unobserved factor.
Formally, '11,12,13,2,3 f j (µ 11 ,µ 12 ,µ 13 ,µ 2 , (, 11 ,, 12 ,, 13 ,, 2 ,, 3 |v) '
where µ , µ , µ , µ , and µ are mutually independent. The joint density of the equation-specific common to all equations, the model reduces to a multinomial logit estimating insurance choice, a logit estimating participation, and a log expenditures OLS regression.
Nevertheless, the common unobserved variable v is present. V may include the individual's risk aversion, detailed health status, and attitudes toward medical care. The joint density function for the five simultaneous disturbances conditional on v is
The variance components structure yields a joint conditional density function that is the product of univariate densities, and is therefore computationally feasible.
The estimation is by maximum likelihood. For each individual, there are six possible outcomes for the discrete variables: the individual could be in one of three insurance states, and one of two expenditure states. In other words, there are six possible regions in (, , , , , , , )
( 3 where the first three branches are the conditional probabilities of being observed in each of the insurance states; the fourth branch is the conditional probability of being observed with no expenditures; and the fifth branch is the observed level of expenditures conditional on positive expenditures (and v).
The unconditional likelihood is found by integrating out over the distribution of v. We approximate the distribution of v by a step function where That is, the step function has K points of support, the 0 , and P is the probability of being at each As in all polychotomous choice models, the coefficients on " , " and D are normalized product of D and 0 . In our estimation, we normalize 0 to -0.5 and 0 to 0.5. These mass point j k 1 K normalizations imply no substantive restrictions because the product D 0 remains unrestricted. j k
We set K=2. Maximization of equation (14) yields estimates of the impact of all observed variables from equations (4) through (6), the D from equation (7), and the P from equation (12 Although equations (4) The W variable represents knowledge of the health care system, and helps identify the participation decision. We use the presence of a new baby (born in the survey year) in the family as a proxy for parental knowledge of health services. Recent parents are exposed to health providers during the birth (or adoption) process, and therefore must have some minimum information about health provision. Because otherwise-identical parents may not have this minimum level of information, the disutility associated with participation is lower for the older children of recent parents than for other children. At the same time, the presence of a new baby is unlikely to influence the level of expenditures for the older siblings because the expenditure equations already control for the number of children in the family, the child's age, and other relevant variables. The presence of a new baby is also included in the Z vector. Table 1 Changes in the exogenous characteristics of the children include increases in the number of black and Hispanic children, and a decrease in the average age of the children. Table 2 presents partial results from the estimation of the full model, equation (14).
III. Results
Although the insurance choice coefficients are not presented, Table 3 The first and third columns of Table 2 present key coefficients describing the participation decision. The economic variables are significant in both years. Children with private and Medicaid coverage, who face a lower price of care, experience an increased probability of any outpatient expenditures. The participation probability for a child with the median characteristics increases from 70% to 71% if the child has private coverage, decreases from 78% to 76% if the child has Medicaid, and decreases from 65% to 56% if the child is uninsured. Children in families below four times the federal poverty line are less likely than wealthier children to have positive expenditures. However the relationship between poverty and participation generally weakens over time.
Black children are substantially less likely than white children to have any expenditures, although the magnitude of this difference seems stable. On the other hand, Hispanic children experience a worsening over time in the probability of any expenditures. Despite a popular concern over the quality of the lives of children of never-married mothers, these children are indistinguishable from the children in conventionally married families. In fact, it is the children of unmarried male headed families who experience a smaller probability of participation in 1987. In both years, the probability of expenditures is U shaped in age, with the minimum near age 12.
The presence of a new baby is a significant determinant of participation in 1977, but not in 1987.
Although it is desirable to use an exclusion restriction that is statistically significant in both years, it is important to note that the model is identified without any exclusion restrictions.
The second and fourth columns of Table 2 The coefficient on private insurance decreases from .39 to .22, while the coefficient on Medicaid is stable at about .33.
Demographic variables also influence expenditures. The black/white expenditure differential is roughly constant over time at about 23%. On the other hand, the Hispanic/white differential increases from .11 to .31. There are no expenditure differentials between children in a family headed by a never-married woman and children in a two-parent family. In fact, in a result consistent with Currie and Gruber (1996) , it is the children of unmarried men who experience lower expenditures than the children of married couples in 1987. Expenditures are more strongly influenced by the age of the family head in 1987 than in 1977, but the relationship between the child's own age and expenditures is largely unchanged. The expenditure premium associated with being the eldest child falls over time, and there are no strong relationships between expenditures and the number of children in the family. Table 4 presents partial results from the estimation of equation (14) The estimation setting only D =0 assumes that insurance is exogenous, but allows for 1i selection effects in the expenditure equations. The results, not shown, are virtually identical to those for exogenous selection and insurance. Controlling for sample composition has no effect on the estimated impacts of insurance, poverty status, or other variables. We therefore confirm the fundamental conclusion from the RHIE/selection debate. Controls for sample selection do not alter inferences from medical demand estimation, even though our estimation scheme is fully simultaneous.
IV. Conclusions
What do we really know about trends in outpatient medical expenditures for children?
The results of the joint estimation of insurance status, participation into medical expenditures, and the level of expenditures suggest that both economic and demographic factors influence expenditures in 1977 and 1987. Children in poor families, Hispanic children, and children in families headed by a single male witness a decline in expenditures relative to other children.
Although the black/white expenditure differential has not grown over time, this racial differential remains substantial. The relationship between Medicaid and expenditures is stable, while private insurance has a somewhat weaker influence on expenditures in the later year.
We also know that methodology matters. The health economics literature generally focuses on issues of selection, and concludes that inferences are robust across the RHIE two part and Heckit models. We confirm that selection is unimportant empirically. The literature's focus on selection, however, is somewhat misplaced because it masks the importance of the endogeneity of insurance. In 1987, for example, treating Medicaid as exogenous substantially overstates the Medicaid/uninsured expenditure differential. As the RHIE data becomes increasingly dated, it is increasingly important to improve the estimation techniques used with nonexperimental data.
Although the discrete factor framework for simultaneous equations has not yet been widely used in heath economics, the methodology appears promising. Instrumental variables and family fixed effects are often too imprecise to be useful.
Finally, we know that the recent Medicaid eligibility expansions should partly achieve the goals of increased care for children. Children on Medicaid do have significantly higher expenditures than uninsured children. At the same time, the effectiveness of the expansions will vary with the race and family composition of the child. We conclude, as did Currie and Thomas (1995) , that simply equalizing budget constraints by expanding Medicaid (or the Children's Health
Insurance Program) will not equalize care across different groups of children.
What don't we know about trends in outpatient medical expenditures? It is impossible to tell whether the observed differences are caused by tastes or constraints. At the same time, the observed racial differences clearly indicate a public policy problem. For example, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that a child have at least one physician visit at age four. We use the estimates in Table 2 to calculate the probability that this recommendation is followed for representative four year olds. Even among those children on Medicaid, about 16% of whites, 23% of Hispanics, and 28% of blacks have no predicted medical expenditures. The Medicaid (or CHIP) expansions will not help these children meet the suggested guidelines for good health.
Data Appendix
This Notes: For probsup1, the values in parentheses are the probability weights on the first support point. For all other coefficients, these values are standard errors. The probability coefficient for support one is highly significant in both years. The first and second supports are normalized to -0.5 and 0.5, respectively. The omitted dummy categories are male, white, noteldest, healthex, uninsure, newb_no, poor4up, non_smsa, mhead_cmar, hda17_24, and hdedlt12. Each specification also includes dummy variables for Census division. The value of the log likelihood is -21,044.7 in 1977 and -17,028.4 in 1987. 
